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USSR Monthly Review

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

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Contents

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Politics and Policy in the New Soviet Leadership

Perspective: The Brezhnev Succession—Andropov's Initial Moves

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In his first two months as the USSR's new party leader, Yuriy Andropov has sought to overcome the apparent drift and stagnation that characterized Brezhnev's last years, and to give Soviet politics and policy a sense of decisive direction and movement. One result is that many Soviet officials privately assert to foreigners their relief that the "deathwatch" is over and that the USSR can now address its foreign and domestic problems.

Precisely how Andropov emerged as the top party leader as well as the extent of his power remain subjects of some controversy, as is evident in the articles in the "Viewpoint" section of this issue. Nonetheless, most observers agree that Andropov seems firmly entrenched as General Secretary. He is widely regarded within the Soviet elite as intelligent, sophisticated, and capable. He has confidently established himself as the Soviet Union's principal foreign policy spokesman—a feat that took Brezhnev several years to accomplish. On the domestic scene, removal of the often criticized Minister of Railways has signaled that Andropov intends to back up criticism with action and that the succession process has not led to political paralysis.

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At the same time, Andropov has not fully consolidated his power or attempted to set a distinctly new course in domestic policy. The personnel changes made so far, as noted in the article "The Leadership Ranks in Transition," reflect his influence but they have not been his choices alone and have not measurably altered the power balance within the leadership. He must still operate within the Politburo consensus and seek to lead it. He still lacks the power to impose major policy changes over the opposition of his colleagues as discussed in the lead article of this issue.

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Andropov seems to recognize this, and his initial public remarks have indicated that he intends to move cautiously in developing a new domestic program.

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Andropov for the present has concentrated on noncontroversial topics, implementing decisions already approved and taking such obviously necessary actions as improving transportation and attacking low-level corruption. More radical changes may take shape in the next year or two as the 1986-90 Plan is formulated (see "The Economy Under Andropov"). He evidently has delegated responsibility for developing potentially controversial economic reform proposals to the newest and least experienced party secretary, Nikolay Ryzhkov, perhaps as a way of distancing himself from the process and avoiding close identification with the results. 25X1 25X1

Andropov seems to have more room to maneuver in the area of foreign policy, but here too he and his colleagues face important challenges. Eastern Europe remains a source of potential political instability and a drain on the Soviet treasury. While the Soviets have little choice but to shoulder the burden, Andropov may with time demand greater belt tightening and ideological controls from the Bloc to complement Soviet efforts (see "Impact of Soviet Succession on Moscow's Policy Toward Eastern Europe"). 25X1

The Soviet leadership is likely to assume a more activist posture on other foreign policy problems as well (see "The Foreign Policy Agenda of the New Leadership"). It has affirmed the broad outlines of Brezhnev's foreign policy, but the effort to seek improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has gathered new steam, and arms control initiatives and pressures on the West Europeans to stop INF deployment have intensified as the West German elections draw closer. Soviet interest in restoring the centrality of Soviet-US relations also has been revived. Most important, Andropov has developed a consensus sufficiently strong to launch new initiatives and respond quickly to those placed before him. 25X1

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An Assessment of Andropov's Power

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General Secretary Yuriy Andropov is the most authoritative leader in the Politburo and has demonstrated impressive political power from the outset. He certainly has more strength than Brezhnev had at the beginning of his long tenure (in 1964). Andropov's status as top leader was most evident in his meetings with foreign leaders only days after he became General Secretary. Moreover, he has already been given pride of place in protocol rankings and in leadership listings, and a few officials have begun to refer to him as the "head of the Politburo," an accolade not given to Brezhnev until several years after he was named General Secretary.

The Politburo's decision to promote Andropov almost certainly reflected an informal understanding—at least among a core group of members—that the country needed a strong leader, that Andropov was best qualified to assume the post, and, more important, that Konstantin Chernenko—his chief rival and Brezhnev's choice—was weak and unacceptable. Andropov undoubtedly exploited such negative views of Chernenko in his successful efforts in May to maneuver his way back into the Secretariat in order to become a major contender in the succession sweepstakes. While Brezhnev's patronage gave Chernenko some obvious advantages in this contest, this strength was not institutionalized and evaporated with Brezhnev's death. We believe the speed of Andropov's rise reflected a leadership desire to project an image of decisiveness abroad and avoid any signal of conflict and political paralysis, not a prearranged decision made last May when Andropov entered the Secretariat. Chernenko's own visibility and activity in recent months suggest that the contest remained open while Brezhnev was alive.

The Lineup

We do not know how various Politburo members voted in the Andropov-Chernenko contest or even whether a formal vote was taken, but Moscow rumors,

At a minimum Andropov seems to have had strong backing from Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, and Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. With their political fortunes still ahead of them, the two youngest Politburo members—party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Leningrad First Secretary Grigoriy Romanov—may have joined this strong coalition as well, at least on this vote. Chernenko probably received support from the two Brezhnev loyalists—Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov and Kazakhstan First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Viktor Grishin, the Moscow party chief, may have joined this group, possibly in the hope of becoming a compromise choice. Octogenarian Arvid Pelshe was very likely too sick to play a role in the decision. Chernenko apparently did not fight the decision to the bitter end, opting instead to close ranks behind Andropov and preserve his position as "second" secretary, a strategy that for the present has been successful. Only Grishin—to judge from his slippage in protocol rankings—seems to have fought excessively and suffered for it.

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Andropov thus has institutional support where it counts. The national security apparatus, particularly the military-industrial complex and the KGB, is behind him. Such backing gives him added room for maneuver but, at least in the case of the military, cannot be taken for granted. He will, in addition, need to strengthen his position within the party apparatus. He lacks a strong regional base and must depend on officials whose careers he has had little influence in shaping.

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Opportunities and Flexibility

Andropov, nonetheless, has come to power with what seems to be solid backing and without resorting to a major political bloodbath. This situation has allowed him to assume a more authoritative stance in the leadership than Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev did at a comparable point in past successions. His promotion has given a new momentum to leadership decisionmaking. Indeed, for the first time in years the

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Soviets have a leader who puts in a full day. From what we can tell, his colleagues recognize and value his ability and perceive him to be intelligent. They know from his tenure as KGB chief that he can be counted on to be decisive in preserving the party's legitimacy and social order. They probably expect him—within limits—to be a bold, forceful leader, and they are likely to give him some room to be one. As a result, he is probably in a strong position to influence and lead the Politburo consensus.

Andropov seems to be in a particularly good position to chart the course of Soviet foreign policy. He has considerable experience and knowledge in this area and is obviously inclined to take an active role. Foreign policy initiatives, moreover, have the potential for producing beneficial results more quickly than changes in domestic policy, a matter of considerable importance for a leader who wants to build his power. He is not as likely, in addition, to encounter the sharp factional infighting and debate that occurs over proposals for domestic shifts, particularly in economic management.

This situation effectively means that the Soviet Union will not be paralyzed in the foreign policy arena. Andropov has room for maneuver here and can be expected to propose initiatives and respond to those from abroad he deems serious. In doing so, however, he will rely heavily on two of his colleagues on the Defense Council, Defense Minister Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, for advice. He would certainly need their support to get the Politburo's assent to a major shift in Soviet foreign policy or to make major modifications in arms control negotiations with the United States. Andropov will probably count on his personal and political alliance with Ustinov and apparently good working relationship with Gromyko to help create the Politburo consensus required for important departures.

It seems likely that the three have been key figures in formulating the Soviet foreign policy line pursued in Brezhnev's last years. They were probably major actors in the decisions regarding the invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet policy toward Poland, and were associated with Brezhnev's conciliatory remarks toward China shortly before his death. As long as they remain united and stay within the broad parameters of established Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo is likely to follow their lead. If, on the other hand, there are significant disagreements between them on future foreign policy steps or tactics, Andropov would not be likely to force the issue, at least in the near term. 25X1

Constraints

This flexibility on foreign policy, nonetheless, does not mean that Andropov has carte blanche from the Politburo. While he can lead and shape the consensus, he is still bound by it. The Politburo remains a collegial body, and its current membership is neither beholden to Andropov nor under his thumb. Andropov is indebted to many of his Politburo colleagues, particularly Ustinov, and is dependent on their collusion and support until he can reshape the Politburo, a process that could take several years. 25X1

Some of Andropov's colleagues, moreover, are evidently trying to hold back his advance. The failure to name a replacement for Brezhnev as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet indicates conflict. The personnel changes made since Andropov became party chief, while almost certainly endorsed by him, seem to have served the interests of others within the leadership (Ustinov and Chernenko, for example) as well.[1] Even if Andropov is eventually named Soviet president (perhaps at the summer session of the Supreme Soviet), he must still push through even more politically important personnel shifts in the Politburo and Secretariat to consolidate his position and to dominate policy. 25X1

The collective restraint on Andropov is likely to be particularly evident in domestic policy. While the entire leadership is undoubtedly committed to solving Soviet economic problems as a top priority, consensus on what the solution should be has not been reached. Economic issues are inherently political, complex, and 25X1

[1] These personnel changes have included shifting Geydar Aliyev from head of the Azerbaijan Republic party to Moscow as a voting member of the Politburo and a first deputy premier, and shuffling the heads of the Komsomol, the Central Committee Propaganda Department, the KGB, and the MVD 25X1

controversial. The bureaucratic obstacles to significant changes in economic management are immense. Andropov is probably generally knowledgeable about the economy and is certainly well informed about issues affecting internal security, but he has little personal experience in economic management and his closest supporters are more concerned with foreign and security policy. Moreover, as Andropov emphasized to the Central Committee, no one has all the solutions to the country's economic difficulties. As a result, he is likely to move cautiously in this area—a strategy he said was needed in his plenum speech.

Domestic and Foreign Policy Linkage

Significant movement toward resolving the nation's economic problems might, in fact, require that Andropov first achieve some relaxation of tensions with the United States or China, or both. Only by doing so can he justify to his colleagues and the military some reallocation of resources from defense to investment, an essential step in any plan to address the country's economic problems.

In this regard, the next two years are particularly crucial for Andropov and the Politburo. The planning cycle for the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90) is already under way. We know from historical precedent that the Soviet military's assessment of the external threat is an essential element in this cycle and will be formally developed during 1983. The Politburo in 1984 will act on this military assessment in allocating resources for the next five-year defense plan. This will be the new Politburo's first formal and comprehensive ordering of internal priorities between economic investment and defense procurement. Without reduction in international tensions, which some in the military such as Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov contend are exceedingly high, the rate of defense growth will be politically hard to reduce. But failure to reduce growth in defense spending will make it very difficult to address Soviet economic problems and over the long run will erode the economic base of the military-industrial complex itself.

Conclusion

On balance, the speed with which the new General Secretary was appointed, his assertion of a leading role in foreign policy, and his self-confident statements on international issues reflect real strengths that were not present in Brezhnev's final days. The personnel actions taken by the new regime in the several weeks it has been in office (see following article) suggest a new momentum in leadership decisionmaking. Moreover, the new leadership, so far, has been able to demonstrate a unity of purpose. In sum, all the available evidence points to a strong regime that can act decisively and forcefully, particularly in the foreign policy field

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The Leadership Ranks in Transition

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Yuriy Andropov is moving cautiously to place his stamp on key personnel decisions. While a number of changes have been announced since he became General Secretary, most appear to have been the product of compromise, and some may even have been decided before Brezhnev's death. The cumulative effect of the actions already taken, however, has given the impression of decisive movement after the stagnation of Brezhnev's last years, major new appointments are likely in the spring.

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Opportunities and Constraints

Andropov appears to have a unique opportunity to influence within a relatively short span of time the selection of the next generation of party and government leaders. As a result of the failure of the old guard to rejuvenate the top and middle ranks of the party leadership, a record number of positions are now or soon will be vacant. To judge from his words and actions, moreover, Andropov intends to capitalize on this situation and use a campaign against corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency to weed out deadwood and bring in people of his own.

Andropov has some obstacles to overcome, however, in expanding his influence within the party and government. His experience in party work has not been extensive enough to develop a network like Brezhnev's of personal contacts and clients that he can draw on to staff key positions. While he can and probably will continue to use his KGB associates for this purpose, any attempt to pack the party machinery with them would almost certainly create political opposition. As a result, he is likely to rely on recommendations from his Politburo allies in making personnel decisions—Shcherbitskiy already seems to be working closely with Andropov in this regard.

Such dependence will give his colleagues some political leverage and will tend to reinforce continued collegiality within the Politburo. The presence of two Brezhnev cronies—Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and party secretary Konstantin Chernenko—in key institutional positions is also likely to restrict Andropov's ability to remake the bureaucracy in his own image.



Yuriy Andropov *Time Magazine ©*

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Signs of Resistance

The failure of the Politburo to pick a new president suggests that an effort is being made to contain Andropov.

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Andropov was unable to push his rival Chernenko into the post, to persuade his ally Gromyko to take it, or to secure it for himself.

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he may hope to maneuver Chernenko into the post later or to gain it for himself—but they have not been able to dispel entirely the impression that the Politburo is in some disarray on this issue.

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Nikolay Ryzhkov

Geydar Aliyev Sovfoto ©

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Changes at the Top

The decisions actually made, moreover, had probably been in the works before Brezhnev's death. Andrey Kirilenko was removed from the Politburo and party Secretariat. Planning official Nikolay Ryzhkov was named to the Secretariat, and Azerbaijan party boss Geydar Aliyev was elevated to full membership on the Politburo. Two days later, at the Supreme Soviet session, Aliyev's appointment as First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers was announced.

The Ryzhkov Appointment. Ryzhkov's career has been focused entirely outside party apparatus work. Since 1979 he had been a first deputy chairman of Gosplan with responsibilities for heavy industry and machine building, and before that he served for many years as manager of a huge machine-building complex in Sverdlovsk. He presumably owed his Gosplan position to Andrey Kirilenko, who headed the Sverdlovsk party organization in the early 1950s. Ryzhkov's close connections with the Sverdlovsk group suggest that his appointment may have been part of a prior political deal linked to securing Kirilenko's departure from the Politburo. Ryzhkov is the kind of energetic manager Andropov is looking for, but Andropov is unlikely to have been acquainted with him.

Ryzhkov has been brought into the Secretariat to head the newly established Economics Department. This department reportedly will be responsible for studying ideas for economic reform, particularly in the industrial sector of the economy.

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The Aliyev Appointment. The appointment of Aliyev to the Council of Ministers was the most puzzling action taken. His elevation in the Politburo was not unexpected (there had been rumors of it earlier in the summer), but his government appointment was; it caught even the Supreme Soviet deputies by surprise, judging by the animated stirring in the hall when his appointment was announced.

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Aliyev is Andropov's man and has been brought in to spearhead the drive to ferret out bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption and enforce managerial accountability at all levels of the government. He will reportedly have specific responsibility for the troubled transportation sector. Aliyev's subsequent attendance at a meeting at the Railways Ministry (which was sharply criticized by Andropov at the plenum and is now undergoing a shakeup) would seem to bear this out.

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Aliyev's Politburo status makes him the number-two man in the Council of Ministers, he is slated to replace Tikhonov as premier before spring. Before the plenum, however, Shcherbitskiy—a core member of the Andropov group—would be premier in a new Andropov leadership. He has had far broader experience for the post than Aliyev.

While Aliyev has made a name for himself rooting out corruption in Azerbaijan and has been credited with the republic's remarkable economic recovery, he nevertheless would seem to lack important qualifications for the premiership, and even for the deputy post. He is not himself entirely free of the taint of corruption (there have been rumors that some of his republic's economic achievements are based on falsified data). He has had no experience at the national level and does not know his way around the Moscow bureaucracy. Moreover, his Muslim background is not likely to endear him to the largely Slavic Moscow bureaucracy and is perhaps the most important strike against him for the premiership.

The choice of Aliyev as first deputy premier (rather than some other more qualified official, such as Shcherbitskiy) is all the more puzzling in view of Aliyev's mixed political allegiances. He reportedly was closer to Brezhnev's protege, KGB First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun, than to Andropov. Aliyev had been solidly in the Brezhnev-Chernenko camp until recently and may have owed his promotion to the Politburo in part to their backing. Aliyev was Chernenko's choice to replace Andropov as Chairman of the KGB in May 1982, but he lost out to Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the Ukrainian KGB chief, who reportedly had the solid backing of Shcherbitskiy and Andropov.

In fact, Aliyev probably owes his elevation to support from both camps, but he will almost certainly be more sensitive to Andropov's interests. Andropov, in addition, may feel that Aliyev's wide range of ties will deflect away from himself some of the resentment that is sure to develop if Aliyev's efforts to crack the whip and "get things done" run into resistance.

Andropov also would probably be willing to disassociate himself from Aliyev if he becomes too controversial. 25X1 25X1

The Shrinking Secretariat. As anticipated, the Central Committee plenum dropped Kirilenko from the Politburo and Secretariat on the stated grounds of ill health. The reason for Kirilenko's eclipse is something of a mystery, but considerable evidence suggests that illness and a scandal involving a member of his family earlier this year made him vulnerable to the machinations of political rivals. In any event, he had already been excluded from the leadership for some time before Brezhnev died, and his removal at the plenum was only a formality. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

With Brezhnev's death, the death of Suslov earlier in the year, and now Kirilenko's retirement, the number of senior secretaries (those with full membership in the Politburo) has dropped from five to three: Andropov, Chernenko, and the secretary in charge of agriculture, Gorbachev. Party secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, who oversees the heavy industry sector and had been filling in for Kirilenko during his absences, was expected in Soviet circles to be elevated to full membership in the Politburo at the plenum to replace Kirilenko, but the move may have run into some political difficulty. He is from Krasnoyarsk, a Siberian region known to receive special attention from Chernenko. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Chernenko Hangs In

Chernenko appears to be performing the functions of unofficial "second secretary"—the same functions that Suslov carried out under Brezhnev—and he has recently been ranked right after Andropov in Politburo lineups. He evidently has taken over Suslov's former responsibilities on the party Secretariat for culture, propaganda, and ideology as well, and there is tenuous evidence that he has some responsibility for overseeing personnel assignments. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

Chernenko has reportedly given up his job as head of the General Department (the Politburo's executive officer). He probably no longer has a good claim to this position, as it has traditionally been the General

Secretary's prerogative to have his own man as executive officer. A permanent replacement for Chernenko has apparently not yet been named, however. His longtime assistant, Klavdiy Bogolyubov, is rumored to have been given the job for the time being.

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Chernenko and Andropov appear to share many views on policy issues and may have formed a working arrangement. The new practice of publicizing regular Thursday Politburo meetings, for example, seems to reflect Chernenko's longstanding interest in promoting a more open style of leadership, and the first reported item on the Politburo agenda—work with letters from Soviet citizens—is one with which he has been closely identified. The present arrangement is inherently unstable, however, in view of the two men's political rivalry, and it is clearly in Andropov's interest either to ease Chernenko out of the Secretariat or to bring someone else in to act as a counterweight.

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Vitaliy Fedorchuk Sovfoto ©

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The Pace of Personnel Actions Picks Up

Following the plenum a number of important appointments were made to second-level party and government posts, but again some of them would appear to have been in the works since earlier in the year. In a musical chairs round of appointments:

- First Secretary of the Komsomol (youth organization), Boris Pastukhov, was replaced by one of his deputies and transferred to the less important post of chairman of the state publishing committee.
- The former head of the state publishing committee, Boris Stukalin, in turn, moved up to replace the chief of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, Yevgeniy Tyazhelnikov.
- Tyazhelnikov was given an ambassadorial post.

There were rumors shortly after Suslov died in January that both Tyazhelnikov and Pastukhov would be fired as part of an effort to remove Suslov people from positions of power. Chernenko's apparent assumption now of Suslov's former responsibilities suggests that he probably had some hand in carrying this out—although Andropov's approval would have been required.

The most important reshuffling of assignments since Andropov took over was the replacement of Brezhnev's close associate Nikolay Shchelokov as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) by KGB chief Fedorchuk and the elevation of the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, to succeed Fedorchuk. These moves have allowed Andropov to expand his control over both security organs. The shift is one of the clearest signs of his authority to date.

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On the face of it, the appointment represents a demotion for Fedorchuk; but his initial assignment to the KGB post last May was unusual (typically a professional security officer is not picked for this role) and one for which he did not appear to be well qualified. The choice was probably made with succession-related politics in mind rather than the requirements of the KGB. Andropov presumably supported Fedorchuk in May as part of an effort to bring Shcherbitskiy into his camp and to block any Brezhnev-Chernenko candidate, whether it was Aliyev or one of Brezhnev's men among the KGB deputies.

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Having accomplished this, Andropov was presumably willing to reconsider the appointment after he emerged on top. There is certain to have been widespread unhappiness, particularly among senior officials in the organization, at having Fedorchuk (a relatively junior KGB professional) appointed to the top KGB post, and Andropov's interests may have

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Viktor Chebrikov

been better served by having Fedorchuk move to the MVD post. Fedorchuk reportedly has a mandate to clean up the corruption-riddled police organization and has since been promoted to the rank of general.

The new KGB chief, Chebrikov, like Andropov, has a background in party work. He served for many years in the Dnepropetrovsk party organization (Brezhnev's political bailiwick in the Ukraine), and he was transferred to the KGB in 1967 along with two other close Brezhnev associates soon after Andropov was appointed head. Chebrikov has worked closely with Andropov for the past 14 years, however, and they reportedly are on good terms.

Winds of Change

The pace of personnel actions appears to be quickening. A number of officials at the deputy minister level have been fired and a major shakeup of the media and propaganda apparatus appears to be under way. The editors of several newspapers have reportedly been replaced, and both the head of the Central Committee's International Information Department and his deputy have been reassigned.

the various vacancies in the top leadership will be filled at a Central Committee plenum to be held early this spring.

The cumulative impact of these changes, real and anticipated, contributes to the impression that the long-delayed rejuvenation of the party and government ranks is finally under way, after the near paralysis of Brezhnev's last years. Moreover, Andropov seems to be perceived by the Soviet elite as firmly in control of this process, even if he has not been the principal initiator or sole beneficiary of each individual action.

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The Economy Under Andropov

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The poor performance of the economy during the latter years of the Brezhnev regime has driven home to the Andropov Politburo that there are relatively few opportunities for quick fixes and that the economic problems of the current decade may spill over into the 1990s (see inset). Thus, its policy decisions may be more forward looking. Andropov will be acutely aware that severe disruption of the economic system by the implementation of hasty, ill-conceived policies might be a quick route to both economic and political disaster. The Soviets will continue to be dependent on the West for significant purchases of agricultural products and machinery and equipment for both agriculture and industry, but—in view of their disappointing experience in commercial dealings with the United States—they probably will respond skeptically to US initiatives.

Changes in Decisionmaking Process

The new leadership probably will continue to favor bureaucratic centralism rather than move voluntarily toward fundamental systemic change. These leaders—because of the stringent economic situation and their own personalities—are likely to rely more on tightened discipline and control to effect economic policies of long standing than on coaxing desired behavior through increased incentives. Andropov's long tenure in the KGB has given him experience in using administrative measures to modify behavior. Moreover, the Soviet people, faced with unsettling economic and social problems, seem ready to accept a leader who would demand greater discipline.

This trend, however, would not rule out a mix of liberal and authoritarian measures. Greater dependence on the private sector, for example, is a distinct possibility that could be classified as liberal, while harsher penalties for labor absenteeism and mismanagement, though authoritarian in nature, need not mark a return to Stalinism.

Changes in Policy

The new leaders will surely bring changes in economic policy. Because they have laid particular stress on continuity, and because it may take some time to develop a strong consensus, new policy lines may not appear until 1984-85, when the Five-Year Plan for 1986-90 has been drafted. Some indications of change are likely to be discernible earlier, however, as discussion and debate about policies for the late 1980s ensues and annual plans for 1984 and 1985 are formulated.

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The hardest policy decision for the Andropov leadership will be how to allocate resources among the major claimants. Maintaining historical growth in defense spending would squeeze investment and consumption further. Keeping investment growth at current rates as well might result in an absolute decline in consumption.

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The Military. For the past several years we have seen little or no growth in military hardware procurement. More resources are needed to break economic bottlenecks, and a slowdown (or even zero growth) in military procurement for a few years would have little negative impact on forces already in the field; modernization of these forces could still proceed. We believe the groundwork for such a course may have already been laid in Brezhnev's speech to top military officers on 27 October 1982. In any event, this course will be required if the Andropov Politburo wants to improve economic performance substantially.

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Investment. A strong candidate to receive more investment funds is the machine-building sector—because of the need to modernize Soviet industry and because of constraints on importing foreign machinery and technology. Modernizing machine building would also help justify a temporary slowdown in defense hardware procurement, as such modernization could ultimately enhance military hardware production. The new leadership, with its longer time horizon, might launch such an effort.

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Outlook for the Soviet Economy in the 1980s

Soviet economic growth will continue to decline in the 1980s as average annual rates of increase in labor and capital decline and productivity gains fall short of plans. We expect average annual GNP growth to fall below 2 percent per year in the 1980s:

- *The labor force will grow more slowly than it did in the 1970s—at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent compared with 1.5 percent.*
- *Growth in the productivity of Soviet plant and equipment, which has fallen substantially since 1975, will continue to drop as the cost of exploiting natural resources rises and Moscow is forced to spend more on infrastructure.*
- *Continued stagnation in the production of key industrial materials—particularly metals—will inhibit growth in new machinery, the key source for introducing new technology.*
- *Energy production will grow more slowly and become more expensive, whether or not oil production falls.*
- *With continued growth in domestic energy requirements, Moscow will face a conflict between maintaining oil exports and meeting domestic needs.*
- *Agriculture will remain the most unstable sector of the Soviet economy, with performance in any year highly dependent on weather conditions.*

Slower growth of production will mean slower expansion in the availability of goods and services to be divided among competing claimants—resources for future growth (investment), the consumer, and defense:

- *Rapid growth in defense spending can be maintained only at the expense of investment growth.*
- *Slower expansion of investment will be compounded by the increasing demand for investment goods in the energy, transportation, metallurgy, and machinery sectors.*
- *An increased share of investment in heavy industries, together with continued large allocations to agriculture, will depress the expansion of housing and other consumer goods and services.*

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Making up production shortfalls through imports will become more expensive as the need for imports increases and Moscow's ability to pay (hard currency earnings) declines:

- *The Soviet need for imports of Western grain and other agricultural commodities will remain high in the 1980s, as will requirements for Western machinery and technology.*
- *We expect real export earnings to decline between now and 1990 as sales of natural gas fail to offset the drop in oil earnings, and opportunities to expand exports of other commodities remain limited by their low marketability and tightness in domestic supplies.*
- *The availability of Western credits will be crucial for Moscow to maintain or increase its imports from the West; a tighter credit market would complicate Soviet economic problems and make resource allocation decisions more painful.*

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Consumption. A leadership prone to authoritarian solutions is likely to be more pragmatic in its consumer policy and may place more stress on tying wages and perquisites more closely to production results. Retail prices may also be raised on all but essential goods and services, and an expansion of privately operated consumer services may be in the offing.

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Reform. The Politburo's predilection for administrative measures and bureaucratic centralism would severely limit the extent of future economic reform. The difficult economic situation argues against reform measures—like those launched in Eastern Europe—that have never been tested in the USSR. Some movement toward a regionally organized economy might be thought more suitable to today's problems—for example, exploitation of energy and raw materials in Siberia.

Agriculture. Moscow will continue to support the farm sector but might decide to favor the industries that support agriculture and those that process its output. The Food Program already does this to some extent, but an actual cut of investment inside the farm gate would be a stronger signal of the new leaders' dissatisfaction with the returns from agricultural investment.

Labor. In addition to instilling tighter discipline, the Andropov leadership is likely to focus on automating manual labor (consistent with more investment in machinery) and developing social and cultural infrastructure in labor-deficit regions. The latter would provide some inducement for workers to emigrate from labor-surplus areas and would reinforce a regionally differentiated pronatalist policy favoring the labor-deficit areas.

East-West Trade. With economic problems pressing from every quarter, the leadership might welcome—though perhaps not publicly—the opportunity to expand economic ties with the West in general and with the United States in particular, especially if decisions are taken to maintain slow growth in military hardware, step up investment in machinery, and reduce investment dedicated to the farms. Under these circumstances, Moscow might find it advantageous to press for (1) economic ties that provide the USSR with technology and goods for both civilian and military purposes and (2) arms control arrangements that limit Western advances in military technology which they would find difficult and costly to counter.

Impact of Changes. These changes in approach and policies will not be a panacea for the Soviet economy's ills. Nevertheless, they could bring marginal improvements in key areas and allow the leadership to continue to muddle through even in the face of economic conditions probably worse than they had expected. Of primary importance to the Politburo, these policies would not require the surrender of power and would continue to allow it the freedom to impose its will on the smallest economic or administrative unit. In this way, the leadership could feel assured of its ability to handle such problems as public unrest, external economic or military threats, or internal disasters that would require an emergency redistribution of resources. 25X1 25X1

Economic Relations With the United States

Notwithstanding the importance of expanded economic ties with the United States, the Soviet experience in commercial relations with Washington has been disappointing to Moscow since the mid-1970s, and it would probably take a strong US initiative just to get the attention of the Soviet leaders. Although an offer to renew close economic ties with the USSR might be welcome, it would probably be greeted skeptically by the Soviet leadership as primarily a tactical maneuver—a further retreat by Washington (following the grain and pipeline decisions) brought about by US–West European economic competition and pressures from US business circles. Needing to consolidate his power, Andropov could not—even if he wished—respond unilaterally to such an initiative, but would have to move within a leadership consensus strongly influenced by the views of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov, who would urge caution. Thus the Soviets might: 25X1 25X1

- Accept part of the offer as a means of coping with particularly acute bottlenecks, especially in technology and food supplies.
- Seek to avoid long-term economic dependencies on the United States.
- Exploit any new atmosphere of mutual accommodation as a means of reinforcing support in the United States and Western Europe for cutbacks in defense spending and arms control measures favorable to Soviet interests. 25X1 25X1

The United States, for example, could again become an important source of Soviet purchases of agricultural products and machinery and equipment for both agriculture and industry. The need is there, if the "price" (including sanctity of contract) is right. Soviet agriculture could benefit substantially from US technology in livestock feed production, fertilizer application, and animal breeding, and the United States is still Moscow's best long-term bet for grain imports on a large scale.

The USSR faces increasing dependence on the West in developing and processing its oil and gas resources in the 1980s. The United States is the preferred supplier of most types of oil and gas equipment because it is by far the largest producer, with the most experience, the best support network, and often the best technology. In some products—for example, large-capacity downhole pumps—the United States has a world monopoly (albeit one that could be broken in a few years by entry of other Western producers), and the most critical needs of the Soviet oil industry are for just such equipment.

Because the prospects for Soviet hard currency earnings in the 1980s are far from bright, Western credits will have to cover an increasing proportion of Soviet imports from the West. An increase in the availability of US Government–backed credit could look very attractive to the new leaders in Moscow.

On balance we would expect the Soviets to give any US initiative low-key treatment, publicly casting doubt on US motives, but at the same time seeking to engage the administration in a dialogue about it. A US offer to return to a "business as usual" basis would probably not result in any surge in orders for US companies beyond the sectors in which the United States is already an important supplier. Moscow is at least as likely to use the opportunity created by a US offer to put commercial pressure on the West Europeans and Japanese and exacerbate existing tensions in the Alliance. At a minimum, Moscow would press for US Government guarantees regarding fulfillment of contracts, and it might seek repeal of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. In either case, it would refuse to make any significant political concessions in return—which Andropov probably could not deliver even if he desired. If this process permitted the Soviets to acquire more technology on acceptable terms from the United States, they would do so—but not at the expense of established ties with Western Europe and Japan, or of their own long-term economic independence.

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The Foreign Policy Agenda of the New Leadership

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Precedents

During previous succession periods in the 1950s and 1960s there were definite new departures in foreign policy. In the post-Stalin period, the Soviets worked more actively toward resolving the Korean conflict, signed a peace treaty accepting Austrian neutrality, reopened diplomatic relations with Israel, called off disputes with Greece and Turkey, and moved toward summitry with President Eisenhower. They also made their first moves to counter Western influence in the Third World. In Brezhnev's first years, the Soviets developed a policy of selective detente with France, then slowly did the same with West Germany before turning to improved relations with the United States. Partly in response to worsening relations with China, the Soviets also pressed for a series of arms control measures that led to the nonproliferation treaty and SALT I. At the same time, they began the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, gave impetus to a massive Soviet arms program, and began aiding North Vietnam's effort to take over the South.

Areas of Concern

The new leadership has already taken pains to reaffirm the broad outlines of Brezhnev's foreign policy and to signal the importance of improved ties with the United States. The failure to effect some change in Soviet-American relations directly will probably provide the Soviets greater incentive to play their "European card" against US interests on the Continent or to create the impression of improved relations with China. Andropov's decision to meet with Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz within hours after Brezhnev's funeral indicated the Kremlin's interest in some normalization of US-Soviet relations, though the harsh anti-US rhetoric that has followed suggests no change in fundamental attitudes.

In view of the prospect of an enhanced US strategic challenge in this decade, there is ample incentive for Andropov to try to curb new US arms programs and particularly to prevent or at least delay the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The specter of Pershing II missiles in West Germany and the attendant threat to Soviet strategic forces and command and control capabilities was behind Andropov's decision to go public on the Soviet START and INF initiatives in order to build European and perhaps domestic US opposition to INF deployment. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact's recent offer of a nonaggression pact, there could be further moves on arms control issues in conjunction with the resumption of START, INF, and MBFR talks and the Geneva Disarmament Conference in late January and early February.

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Gromyko's visit to Bonn was a convenient forum to reinforce Soviet arms control initiatives. The visit also provided an opportunity not only to put the United States on the defensive but to increase divisions between the United States and its NATO Allies. Gromyko lobbied for increased Soviet–West European cooperation and trade, which provide political as well as economic benefits for the Soviets. The removal of US sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and the nominal return to normalcy in Poland probably added to the credibility of Gromyko's brief in Bonn.

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A continuing inability to effect some visible reduction of tensions with the United States will generate even greater Soviet interest in improving Sino-Soviet relations and exploiting differences between Washington and Beijing. The Soviets clearly do not want continued antagonism on "two fronts" at a time of more assertive US policies, a mounting US defense effort, and ever-increasing economic problems at home. For these reasons, the Soviets may have sufficient incentive to entertain a unilateral move that could involve withdrawal of several divisions from Mongolia or the Sino-Soviet border.

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Although a reduction of force in any area would be highly controversial within the Soviet military, a significant diminishing of the Soviet military role in

Afghanistan would offer considerable potential rewards:

- Removal of a key obstacle to improved relations with both the United States and China.
- Elimination of a source of embarrassment in the entire Islamic community.
- Improved relations with key European countries as well as India.
- Savings in both lives and resources.

In the Third World, the new leadership is giving every indication of a willingness to be more assertive on behalf of beleaguered clients. Senior Politburo member Viktor Grishin's anniversary speech in December, for example, reaffirmed Soviet support for Cuba and Vietnam. The apparent decision to deploy SA-5 long-range, high-altitude surface-to-air missiles at two sites in Syria marks the first export of this system to the Third World and a fundamental change in Moscow's commitment to Damascus. This decision, which would make Soviet personnel at these sites vulnerable to an Israeli preemptive strike, contrasts markedly with Soviet caution in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer. In tying their prestige more closely than ever to Syria's military fortunes, the Soviets are running a far greater risk of being drawn into Syrian-Israeli hostilities.

Elsewhere, there are no likely targets of opportunity in South America at this juncture, and the Soviets will probably be content to pursue their gradual and incremental strategy in Central America. In Africa they will concentrate on complicating the Namibia talks in which they also find themselves as "odd man out." They also will be alert to opportunities in southern Africa—such as in Mozambique—to expand the Soviet and especially the Cuban presence.

The American Angle

From the Soviets' perspective, there are also areas in which they may anticipate US pressure or blandishment that would have an impact on their ability to improve their international position. Indeed, Andropov must realize that the United States is well placed in certain respects to challenge the international position of the USSR and to exploit Moscow's fear of encirclement:

- The Soviets presumably recognize that the United States could play the role of spoiler in the Sino-Soviet-US triangle by holding out to the Chinese the promise of increased defense cooperation, expanded technological ties, and a more equivocal position on Taiwan.

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- Any US willingness to modify the "zero option" at INF could undercut Soviet initiatives in this area and might help sustain support for US deployments in Western Europe (although such modifications might have other, less desirable consequences for the West).

- The Soviets probably judge that US pressure on Israel and South Africa to become more conciliatory would enhance Washington's prestige and leverage in the Middle East and southern Africa.

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Conversely, Moscow may anticipate some restoration of the centrality of Soviet-American relations that could enhance the USSR's international position and ameliorate its economic problems:

- The new Soviet leaders may try to encourage economic initiatives by the United States, particularly some easing of limits on credits and technology transfer. (See "The Economy Under Andropov.")

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- Notwithstanding recent Soviet references to strengthening defense, Moscow would like to ameliorate a major US arms buildup, which it would be hard pressed to match right now, and sees arms control as the best way to achieve this.

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- Less acrimonious atmospherics and a dialogue with the United States on Third World trouble spots would also be attractive to the Soviets, although past experience strongly suggests they would not alter their behavior.

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Outlook

The Soviets have already suggested that they are looking for ways to restore the notion of the centrality of Soviet-American relations in international affairs, and they presumably realize that some relaxation of tensions would ease the problems of making their own choices on future allocation of resources as well as ease the pressure from the national security apparatus for increased military spending. The rise in stature for Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko suggests the emergence of a consensus on national security issues in general and the prospect of some flexibility on specific issues. Such putative critics of Andropov as Konstantin Chernenko and Viktor Grishin would probably support the triumvirate's efforts to improve relations with the United States in view of their earlier support for Brezhnev's detente and arms control initiatives. The key role will be played by Ustinov, who appears to be in a position to block those intiatives that do not protect the equity of the military.

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Impact of Soviet Succession on Moscow's Policy Toward Eastern Europe

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Brezhnev's passing is likely to accelerate the retreat from the policy of subsidizing East European consumerism and tolerating diversity within the Bloc—a retreat already under way in response to Soviet economic problems and events in Poland. General Secretary Andropov, although unlikely to favor precipitous changes in Moscow's East European policy, probably will prove more forceful than his predecessor in weaning the East European allies from Soviet assistance and promoting CEMA integration. In the next several years, support for a more demanding policy among key institutional actors and younger leaders who are likely to move into positions of greater power probably will translate into much stronger pressure for more economic austerity in Eastern Europe, greater conformity to the Soviet model, and stricter ideological and police controls.

Brezhnev's Policy

Until the last year of the Brezhnev era, Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe tolerated a fair amount of diversity, while setting definite limits on modification of the political system. Moscow demanded certain key commitments—maintenance of the party's leading role, social stability collectively enforced under the Brezhnev doctrine, and fidelity to the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. In return, the Soviets not only countenanced considerable internal autonomy, but encouraged an expansion of ties to the West as part of their detente strategy and, particularly after 1973, underwrote the cost of East European consumerism through major subsidies to their allies.

Beginning in late 1981, however, Soviet and East European economic problems and events in Poland were leading to some retreat from this policy. In late 1981 Moscow ordered reductions in subsidized oil deliveries to several key East European allies and took other steps to reduce its economic support. Moscow also stepped up efforts to increase CEMA integration and reorient Eastern Europe toward meeting more of the USSR's economic needs. It did so, however, without cutting Eastern Europe's important economic ties to the West, since this would have further undermined economic stability in the region.

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Short-Term Prospects

In the short term (one to two years), it appears unlikely that the departure of Brezhnev will result in precipitous shifts in the Kremlin's policy toward Eastern Europe:

- Soviet policy in the Brezhnev era was made by consensus within the Politburo. While Brezhnev's input probably was crucial, the continued dominance of the current Politburo seniors in the new leadership team will make short-term continuity far more likely than during the last two successions in 1953 and 1964.

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- Moreover, the new General Secretary himself has played a key role in the development of Brezhnev's East European policy of the 1970s and the modification of it already in train. Andropov is, therefore, unlikely to favor a precipitous change in this policy.

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Andropov has had considerable experience with policy toward Eastern Europe as Ambassador to Hungary (1954-57), Bloc secretary (1957-67), and head of the KGB.

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he has excellent rapport with the chief of the Central Committee department that oversees relations with Bloc countries, Konstantin Rusakov, who was his deputy when he headed the department.

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Overall, Andropov's track record points to a tough-minded approach in times of crisis. He clashed with the Yugoslavs over ideological diversity in the 1960s, opposed Czech reform in 1968, and took a critical attitude toward Polish regime policy in 1980-82. He will demand strict adherence to Soviet security and foreign policy goals but will probably permit some modification of the Soviet model in Eastern Europe. In the past he has favored tactical flexibility in

ideological policy by publicly approving some economic and political diversity within the Bloc, advocated improved East-West relations, and supported Kadar's reforms in Hungary.

In the near term Andropov is likely to continue the broad lines of the policies pursued by Brezhnev during the last years of his regime. He seems committed to the current policy of weaning Eastern Europe from Soviet subsidies, and in his public statements since November, he has advocated further CEMA integration, an effort initiated last fall before Brezhnev's death. Like Brezhnev, he has publicly endorsed Hungarian economic reforms, and he may favor introducing them elsewhere in the Bloc to promote efficiency so long as these reforms do not significantly affect the political structure.

Although Andropov's policies may initially differ little from Brezhnev's, he will probably pursue a more activist policy in the region than his predecessor given his familiarity with East European issues. He has already been far more assertive in his tactical handling of East European leaders. His brusque behavior with the Yugoslavs—who characterized him as "harsh, not pleasant"—after Brezhnev's funeral indicated his willingness to deal firmly with the USSR's East European neighbors. Andropov also felt sufficiently confident of his relationship with his Warsaw Pact allies not to meet with the East European party heads immediately after Brezhnev's death—unlike Brezhnev who sought consultations with East Europeans after the Khrushchev ouster.

The TASS characterizations of his subsequent meetings with Warsaw Pact leaders—particularly Jaruzelski and Ceaucescu—at the Soviet Union's 60th anniversary celebrations last month indicated some disagreement, leaving the impression that Andropov will be more demanding than his predecessor and less likely to sweep controversy under the rug.

Despite his apparent dominance in the foreign policy area, Andropov will have to contend with the diverse concerns of his Politburo colleagues and key interest groups that have a stake in policy toward Eastern Europe. Andropov's bested rival Chernenko, for one, will probably attempt to play an important role as watchdog for the collective leadership and as protector of Brezhnev's policies at home and in Eastern Europe. Chernenko has also taken a rather flexible approach to policy toward Eastern Europe by accepting the legitimacy of "different roads to socialism" and favoring East European economic reform and, on this issue, at least, seems in accord with Andropov. Chernenko's appointment as head of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission, formerly headed by Suslov, suggests he has already assumed some of Suslov's responsibilities for ideological and foreign policy issues and may play a significant role. Andropov will also have to be particularly solicitous of the representatives of the military, the foreign policy community, and regional party organizations. (See "An Assessment of Andropov's Power.")

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Longer Term Prospects

While most of the senior Politburo leaders, including Andropov, seem favorably disposed to continuing Brezhnev's mixed strategy of economic flexibility and political orthodoxy for the immediate future, albeit with possible important adjustments, factors favoring greater change will mount over the next three to five years. Economic problems are likely to prove the most important factor causing the Soviets to reassess their policy. A renewal of the leadership could also work to bring in leaders less committed to Brezhnev's strategy.

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Among the current Politburo juniors in their early sixties or late fifties, acceptance of Brezhnev's mixed strategy seems less sure, particularly if, as we expect, Soviet economic difficulties intensify. In their public statements, major regional leaders like Vladimir Shcherbitskiy or Grigoriy Romanov, who could move into key positions in the central apparatus over the next few years, have seemed less flexible on foreign policy in general, critical of building social stability on consumerism, and more adamant on the need to maintain ideological orthodoxy. They have also taken a harsh line on East European dissent and unrest and seem disposed to favor stepped-up ideological vigilance and police control to avert unrest.

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On balance, significant change in the USSR's relationship to Eastern Europe in the late 1980s seems probable. The new Soviet leadership that will emerge is more likely to call for a policy of austerity in Eastern Europe, backed up by more ideological and security service vigilance, and reduced dealing with the West. A gradual trend in this direction, in fact, was already emerging under Brezhnev, but it is likely to be pushed more aggressively by several influential interest groups—including the military, police, and party officials—as economic problems in both the USSR and Eastern Europe mount. This would cause friction between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies and generate a more complex environment for a US policy of differentiation.

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Other Topics

Soviet Attitudes Toward Poland After One Year of Martial Law

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One year after the imposition of martial law in Poland, the Soviet leadership seems confident that the worst of the Polish crisis is past. The Soviets remain concerned, however, with the continued disarray in the Polish party, the widespread alienation of Solidarity supporters from the regime, and the persistence of Poland's economic problems. Although Moscow regards Jaruzelski as the best guarantor of its interests now on the scene, Soviet leaders have disagreed with him on important tactical issues.

In the coming year, Andropov's preference for more decisive leadership may translate into increased pressure to hasten the "normalization" of Poland, especially with regard to returning the party to some semblance of its former role.

Moscow's View of Jaruzelski

The Soviet view of General Jaruzelski has fluctuated considerably over time. In the first half of 1981, Jaruzelski—like party leader Kania—was viewed as too conciliatory by many Soviet officials. After Jaruzelski replaced Kania as First Secretary in October and particularly after the imposition of martial law, however, his stock in Moscow rose sharply. This was apparent in the high-level protocol treatment given him during his March 1982 visit to Moscow and the stamp of approval he got at the Crimean meeting with Brezhnev in August. More recently, Moscow has subtly disassociated itself from criticism leveled against Jaruzelski by Tadeusz Grabski, a prominent Polish hardliner, who accused him of allowing the party to atrophy.

The Soviets' willingness to support Jaruzelski against his internal party critics probably was due primarily to his success in suppressing Solidarity. Moreover, his strategic goals—political stabilization, the monopolization of power by the regime, and the revival of the economy—are shared by Moscow. In addition, he has been able to pursue these goals while projecting an image of tactical independence from the Kremlin—a feat that has helped undermine Western support for economic sanctions.

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none of the potential successors to Jaruzelski, such as Stephen Olszowski, are warmly regarded by Moscow.

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Soviet approval of Jaruzelski, however, is far from unqualified. even after the imposition of martial law, officers

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have expressed skepticism about Jaruzelski's loyalty and political wisdom and the views of some of his close advisers. Soon after Brezhnev's death one senior Polish official said that General Secretary Andropov himself remains concerned about Jaruzelski's weak responses to internal challenges.

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Friction Areas

Over the past year, moreover, friction has developed between Jaruzelski and the Soviets on several issues. These have included:

- The status of Solidarity and treatment of the opposition.

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- The influence of the Church and the question of a papal visit.
- The status of the party and the need to return it to its "leading role."

One of Moscow's key expectations from martial law was the removal of Solidarity as a political threat and its replacement with reliable unions under regime control.

between late July and early September Moscow pressed Jaruzelski to end his temporizing. It was partly in response that the Poles finally took the somewhat risky step of delegalizing Solidarity on 9 October.

Soviet-Polish differences also surfaced on Warsaw's handling of the internees, the Solidarity underground, and the broader intellectual opposition. Although the Soviets were satisfied with the performance of Polish security forces in breaking up demonstrations and strikes, some evidence suggests that they would have preferred harsher sentences for Solidarity activists and other regime opponents.

An article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in September renewed earlier Soviet attacks on key Solidarity leaders in detention or still at large and vehemently attacked former Solidarity head Walesa, suggesting Moscow would not look favorably on a wholesale release of internees. The same newspaper also carried an attack on Polish intellectuals in the fall, charging them with supporting the underground.

Despite Soviet misgivings, the Polish regime released large numbers of internees in July and again last fall. On 10 November—the day Brezhnev died and major Solidarity demonstrations fizzled—it ordered Walesa released. Moscow was almost certainly informed in advance and approved the step. Indeed, a prominent Soviet academic specialist strongly hinted that Moscow hoped such gestures would lead to the lifting of US economic sanctions and might be viewed as a sign of Andropov's flexibility. 25X1

Moscow, however, probably agreed to Walesa's release only with considerable trepidation given the Solidarity leader's volatility. Soviet anxieties were probably fed by Walesa's higher public profile in December, and expressions of concern from Moscow may have reinforced the regime's attempts to intimidate him, including his detention on the eve of the 16 December anniversary celebration in memory of the Gdansk strikes of 1970. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Another area of friction has been regime relations with the Church and particularly the question of a papal visit initially proposed for last August. Moscow has, on occasion, valued the Church's role as a moderating influence. However, when street demonstrations broke out in May and continued sporadically until October, Soviet media took a more critical line toward the Church, and implicitly toward Jaruzelski's collaboration with it. Soviet criticism peaked in late June and early July when a papal visit for August was being discussed. US Embassy officers reported that Soviet officials, in a conversation last summer, displayed near paranoia about the Church's influence and particularly about the Pope's role in inspiring the Solidarity movement during his visit to Poland in 1979. The Soviet press hinted that the visit would be a political mistake 25X1 25X1 25X1 the Soviets flatly vetoed the visit for that month. 25X1

There is no evidence that Moscow ever opposed the scheduling of a papal visit for June 1983. Presumably, the key issue last summer was one of timing—the visit coming on the eve of a Solidarity-announced offensive for August—and secondly one of Soviet annoyance over Jaruzelski's procrastination in rejecting the visit. Now that the threat of unrest has diminished, the Soviets may believe a visit would improve the regime's legitimacy and project an image of normalization. However, Moscow will seek to keep the visit apolitical and will not hesitate to veto it again if the political situation becomes unstable. 25X1 25X1 25X1

A third major area of friction has been the declining status of the party. While Moscow had pressed Jaruzelski to impose martial law well before December

1981, there is evidence that many Soviets expected martial law to be replaced after a short time with a more traditional form of civilian party rule. Soviet media treatment of the internment of former First Secretary Gierek and other party officials indicated Moscow's sensitivity toward the unceremonious treatment of former party officials by the Polish military council. On 5 January *Pravda* made it clear that Moscow opposed the creation of a new party, an idea reportedly broached by some of Jaruzelski's liberal advisers like Rakowski.

While the Soviets have indicated that de facto martial law or some form of emergency power will continue for a protracted period, they have periodically applied pressure on Warsaw to revive the party and restore it to its leading role. Prominent Soviet spokesmen have called for purging the Polish party of "ballast"—those party members who had vacillated during the crisis—an idea that has also surfaced occasionally in the Soviet media. Brezhnev's and Tikhonov's congratulatory telegram on the Polish national holiday in July particularly underscored the party's "leading role." A Western political scientist with excellent Polish contacts told the US Embassy in Warsaw that Soviet party secretary Rusakov, who is responsible for Bloc affairs, pressed Jaruzelski in May to set a timetable for return to party rule.

The New General Secretary's Views and Prospects for 1983

Poland will be the most immediately pressing East European issue for General Secretary Andropov. By virtue of his experience with the suppression of unrest in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Andropov probably realizes that the Polish problem is too complex for quick solutions, and he is likely to continue Brezhnev's general approach.

Substantial progress has been made over the last year in attaining Moscow's strategic goal of "normalizing" Poland, but there is still a long way to go. The regime has gained the initiative and controls all the key political levers, but martial law has been suspended in name only and the party has not yet been returned to its leading role. Finally, the economy remains a source of acute concern. 25X1

Recognition of Poland's continued economic weakness probably will lead Andropov to continue Soviet economic assistance at close to current levels. According to an announcement made by Warsaw in early November, the Soviets have permitted Poland to retain a greater share—50 percent instead of 15 percent—of goods produced under coproduction agreements using Soviet-supplied raw materials. They also agreed to continue a 1-billion-ruble trade deficit ceiling for 1983. Both are major concessions to the Poles and may have been tied to Soviet satisfaction over the delegalization of Solidarity in October. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Given his preference for a more decisive approach to Polish problems, Andropov probably will approve, and perhaps even encourage, economic reforms already under way, including efforts to cut consumer subsidies through price increases, as a means of stimulating greater efficiency and economic recovery. He might hold out Kadar's Hungarian experience—repression followed by reform—as a model for the Poles. He will, however, veto any reform moves that threaten to revive the opposition in the factories or which might lead to a revival of Solidarity's influence, even under a different label. 25X1

On the political front, Andropov may press more aggressively than Brezhnev for a return to traditional party rule if the opposition remains quiescent this winter. While Moscow seems likely to support Jaruzelski for the near term as the best candidate to maintain control, Andropov's skepticism about Jaruzelski's capabilities might lead him to prefer a new first secretary if the difficult hurdle of finding an acceptable candidate can be cleared. He is not, however, likely to engineer a coup against Jaruzelski short of a major disagreement, but he probably will exert pressure for a step-by-step return to a more normal pattern of civilian rule. 25X1 25X1 25X1

There may also be continued friction over tactics during the next six months. Jaruzelski's handling of the upcoming papal visit will be carefully scrutinized by Moscow. Revival of the party reforms could be a major bone of contention. Jaruzelski has periodically hinted he favors retaining the party electoral reforms of 1981 after martial law is lifted. The Soviets, particularly former chief ideologist Suslov, had strongly objected to them at the time, and Moscow may no longer see any purpose in living up to any such concessions that were made before martial law. Sharp disagreement could emerge if the Poles make other rumored changes in their political system, including creating a strong presidency, passing a liberalized electoral law, and reforming the civil service to decrease party control over appointments.

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Viewpoint

The following articles represent the views of individual analysts; the judgments and conclusions do not represent a CIA consensus. 25X1

Andropov's Bid for Leadership 25X1

Instead of the turbulence and deep crisis that the world long had expected to follow Leonid Brezhnev's death, there was the rapid choice of a successor, the shrewd and knowledgeable manager Yuriy Andropov, and a seemingly smooth transfer of power. Is the crisis of succession over, then? Did Brezhnev's death transmute the acute political conflict of his last months into political order and a harmonious collective leadership? Not likely. The political contest that placed heavy additional demands on the aging ruler and may have contributed to his death continues after him, but with the shifting loyalties and changing alliances characteristic of Soviet politics in times of instability and uncertainty.

The ongoing contest will decide not only the composition of the leadership and the character of its policies but also the balance among the key instruments of rule—the party apparatus, the economic bureaucracy, the political police, and the military. That balance could change in fundamental ways, making the Soviet Union of Brezhnev to which we have grown accustomed something quite different.

Throughout 1982 two powerful factions struggled for power, one led by Brezhnev and his protege, Konstantin Chernenko, the other by Yuriy Andropov. The Andropov faction's main strength was in the political police, with islands of support in the military, the party apparatus, and the media. The Brezhnev-Chernenko team's support was chiefly in the party apparatus, especially outside Moscow, and in the highly bureaucratized government. It had serious vulnerabilities arising from Brezhnev's age and frailty and Chernenko's poor credentials, which made him unacceptable to some of Brezhnev's key associates.

When Brezhnev died on Wednesday, 10 November, Andropov moved quickly to take advantage of the resulting disarray among his opponents. The next day *Pravda* announced that the funeral commission would be chaired by Andropov, thus pointing to Brezhnev's successor as General Secretary. The following morning an "extraordinary" session of the Central Committee, actually a rump session of selected members, formally chose Andropov General Secretary. While Chernenko probably would not have succeeded Brezhnev even in a carefully prepared deliberative meeting, his faction might have been able to block the erstwhile KGB head, perhaps enabling a compromise figure like Viktor Grishin to gain the office.

After its major early success, the Andropov faction encountered setbacks. Ten days after the Central Committee's "extraordinary" meeting elected Andropov General Secretary, the Committee met in regular session, but this time the opposing faction, having had time to regroup its forces, prevented Andropov from securing Brezhnev's second key post as head of state. This sequence conforms to the pattern of the two previous successions, when Stalin died in 1953 and when a coup ousted Khrushchev in 1964. In all three a powerful faction moved to seize control in the first hours, provoking a counterattack from the opposition and a subsequent redistribution of power.

The two factions have since maintained an unstable balance. Andropov is mentioned prominently in the press and is now the recognized spokesman of the new leadership. Several regional leaders who were among Chernenko's strongest supporters while Brezhnev lived have since been in the forefront of those acknowledging Andropov's ascendancy. As yet, however, Andropov has instituted no new programs. His rival, Chernenko, continues to be presented as the "second" Secretary, as he was under Brezhnev, and some of his pet projects, such as soliciting letters from the Soviet public, are being fostered. Moreover, by newly publicizing the Politburo's regular meetings, the post-Brezhnev leadership has paid tribute, at least, to the principle of collective leadership.

Andropov's ability to make appointments appears to be narrowly limited. The relatively few shifts of personnel that have occurred do not testify unequivocally to his power. The transfer of Andropov's protege, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, from State Security (the KGB) to Internal Affairs (the MVD) after only a few months in office may have been due to pressure from the military leadership. (Fedorchuk had for many years specialized in counterintelligence work in the armed forces.) The new KGB head, Viktor Chebrikov, was a Brezhnev protege and may have retained ties with Chernenko. The only new Politburo member, Geydar Aliyev, a longtime Chernenko booster, may have switched sides, although it is also possible that he has managed to make himself acceptable to both camps.

Moscow rumors have it that Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov is formally aligned with Andropov, but this is questionable. Although Ustinov advanced to the first rank of Politburo leaders following Brezhnev's death (along with Andropov, Chernenko, government head Nikolay Tikhonov, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko), in recent newspaper photographs he is back in the second rank. An alliance between the former KGB head and the current Defense Minister, if there has been one, has sinister implications for the Soviet people, but it poses dangers for the principals as well.

The present instability in the leadership and the shifting balance among the regime's institutions leave the situation fluid. Andropov's efforts to capitalize on this fluidity to win personal control of the party apparatus and to consolidate personal power face formidable obstacles. If he is able to consolidate power, Andropov may rule over a power structure in which the armed forces and the political police, at least initially, will have substantially more political weight, and the party apparatus less, than in past decades.

The balance of forces between the two sides is unusually difficult to assess, in part because the political weights of the regime's key institutions seem to have changed. For almost three decades the apparatus of full-time party officials has been sovereign in Soviet politics, imposing its will on the economic bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the political police. Nikita Khrushchev was especially determined to maintain the party's supremacy and assure the subordination of the military and the KGB. Brezhnev, however, altered the balance somewhat, increasing the political status of both the military and the KGB, whose chiefs became voting members of the Politburo after 1973. Throughout the 1970s the military was nourished by constantly growing defense budgets, while the KGB acquired increased resources and prestige to deal with the consequences of detente: organized dissidence and increased contacts of citizens with foreign visitors.

Brezhnev still ruled chiefly through the party apparatus, but he allowed his personal control of it to be diluted as he engaged more actively in foreign diplomacy. Yet he refused to allow new blood into the Secretariat, which consequently lost vigor and became less effective in enforcing party directives. In this way, Brezhnev's prolonged preoccupation with protecting his own power and his belated decision to push Chernenko forward as heir-presumptive weakened the apex of the political structure. This provided an opening for Andropov last May, when Brezhnev was unable to prevent his moving from the KGB into the Secretariat. After Brezhnev's death in November, Andropov, still basing himself largely on the KGB, succeeded in winning the top office in the party apparatus. By failing to protect itself from the intrusion of outside forces, the party apparatus displayed a vulnerability that raises the question of whether it is still the decisive actor in Soviet politics.

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Andropov's Power Base

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The nature of Yuriy Andropov's current power depends decisively upon how he came to be chosen General Secretary. But critical aspects of this process remain obscure. We do not know whether the succession was "prearranged" in the months preceding Brezhnev's death. We do not have a confident grasp of the factional alignments and politics within the Politburo in this period. Finally, we do not have any substantiated picture of the sequence of events, procedures, and participants involved in the nomination of Andropov in the period between Brezhnev's death on 10 November and the convening of the Central Committee plenum that formally confirmed him on 12 November. Thus, whether Andropov emerged as leader of the party through a basically consensual process or through the kind of political intrigue characteristic of Soviet leadership politics since Lenin's time is still a mystery. What evidence there is suggests that there was a struggle for the succession, that it continued until late in the game, and that the choice of Andropov was not unanimous.

Andropov undoubtedly enjoys certain important advantages in comparison with Konstantin Chernenko, at least in the eyes of those who turned out to have the dominant voice. He is decisive, well informed about foreign affairs, probably identified with "sound" positions on national security issues, experienced in repressing all forms of dissent (national, working class, and intellectual), and a leader—not a staff man. It is probably true that Andropov was perceived as the member of the Politburo best equipped to deal vigorously with the problems confronting the USSR in the 1980s. Yet he was far from an ideal candidate. His KGB ties represented an implicit threat to party apparatus hegemony, he himself had not risen to high office through line leadership posts in the territorial party apparatus (as had Khrushchev and Brezhnev), he was relatively old and not in the best of health, and he had no experience whatever in either industry or agriculture—those areas most in need of "strong leadership." As much as anything, his rise to power was conditioned by the eclipse of Andrey Kirilenko, the restriction of Mikhail Gorbachev to agricultural matters, and Brezhnev's success in preventing the cooption into the Politburo of younger, more dynamic party officials with broad organizational and economic supervisory experience.

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Was Andropov's Selection Dictated to the Politburo?

However much Andropov may have maneuvered to gain the succession, he ultimately owes his selection to the decision of others—his power from the outset has been mortgaged. But who holds this mortgage? It is conceivable, although unlikely, that former KGB chief Fedorchuk and Minister of Defense Ustinov employed their organizational power to intervene decisively in some physical sense to "dictate" Andropov's selection. If this is the case, the Soviet political system may have undergone a fundamental, if silent, transformation.

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One might postulate a number of scenarios:

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- Scenario 1: Communications control and/or physical force are applied to prevent some Politburo members from attending the Politburo meeting(s) held after Brezhnev's death to decide who should be "recommended" to the Central Committee for the post of General Secretary.

- Scenario 2: In meeting after Brezhnev's death to discuss the succession, the Politburo (or a pro-Chernenko group of members) is threatened either with personal retribution or with an actual military assumption of power (perhaps along Polish lines) if it does not accede to the selection of Andropov.

- Scenario 3: Threats of personal retribution and/or a military assumption of power are employed to compel a majority favoring Chernenko at the Central Committee plenary session on 12 November to switch allegiance and confirm Andropov.

- Scenario 4: Communications control, constraints on transportation, and/or physical force are employed to influence the composition of a group larger than the Politburo but smaller than the full Central Committee that may have met at some point between 10 and 12 November to consider any Politburo recommendations and discuss the succession prior to the full plenum on 12 November.

- Scenario 5: At any point in the proceedings, Marshal Ustinov declares his support for Andropov's candidacy, perhaps indicating that Andropov "enjoys the confidence" of the military establishment.

- Scenario 6: At any point in the proceedings, or beforehand, Andropov engages—if only slightly—in political blackmail based on KGB-gathered derogatory information to neutralize individual opponents.

A "normal" or "regular" succession may be defined as one that is acceptable to the "selectorate" (namely, the Politburo membership) and has been legitimized by precedent. The essential elements of such a process would include:

- Factional conflict within the Politburo, probably involving maneuvering by one or more inner power clusters, and possibly extending to broader circles outside the Politburo.
- Settlement of the issue without resort to physical means or threat of these means.
- Choice of the new General Secretary fundamentally through co-option by the Politburo itself, not by the *diktat* of any other institution (least of all the KGB or military establishment).
- Consideration of the opinion of different elements within the political elite.
- Confirmation of the Politburo's recommendation by a full plenary meeting of the Central Committee, at which dissonant viewpoints can be expressed.

Judged by this measure of "regularity" (which has only a slight resemblance to the "democratic" process of election by the Central Committee that is formally stipulated by the party rules), scenarios 1, 2, and 3 would clearly be "irregular," and could be said to represent a coup d'etat; scenario 4 would fall short of a coup, recalling the kinds of activity by the KGB and military that occurred in June 1957 and October 1964; and scenarios 5 and 6 would fall well within the bounds of tolerable "political" action. There is no evidence indicating that scenarios 1-3 occurred in the Andropov succession. Scenario 4 is suggested by several as yet unconfirmed newspaper accounts (see Dusko Doder, *The Washington Post,* 21 November 1982, and *The New York Times,* 15 November 1982). Scenario 5 (which could be combined with scenarios 4 and 6) is indicated— 25X1
25X1
and scenario 6 is possible in the light of evidence that, over the past year, Andropov used derogatory information about Brezhnev's relations and associates to undermine Brezhnev's political position. 25X1

Limited Freedom of Maneuver More Likely

Much more likely, Andropov owes his selection to support from a broader coalition of Politburo members, among whom Ustinov is probably the most influential. In any case, Andropov's freedom of maneuver is constrained by the need to pay close heed to the personal and institutional interests of those who put him in office. 25X1
25X1

At the time of his confirmation as General Secretary, no full member of the Politburo had ever served under Andropov, and none were indebted to him for their careers or owed their Politburo membership to him. At most, Andropov might have been—or might be—in a position to exert pressure upon individual members of this group through political blackmail. Among the nine candidate members, at least one (Geydar Aliyev), and perhaps several, had enjoyed Andropov's patronage, but such a group could not approach a majority. And among the three junior Central Committee secretaries who were not even candidate members of the Politburo, only one (Konstantin Rusakov) was clearly an Andropov client. Even if we assume that the elections on 24 November of Aliyev to full membership in the Politburo (and to the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and of Nikolay Ryzhkov to the Secretariat were steps taken with Andropov's approval (which, on balance, is most likely the case), he still enjoys only the most marginal client base within the leadership. 25X1
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In other words, Andropov must deal with independent political actors in the Politburo who, apart from conceivable subterranean debts, owe him nothing. Some of them, of course, are only local barons with bases in the provinces—Dinmukhamed Kunayev, Grigoriy Romanov, and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. But others are in Moscow and are lords of broader domain—Chernenko, Gorbachev, Viktor Grishin, Andrey Gromyko, Nikolay Tikhonov, and Ustinov. Accumulating evidence suggests that Ustinov has assumed a powerful role in the new leadership.

As a group, the Politburo members have a strong personal stake in maintaining "collectivity." However, they appear to be willing to delegate operational authority to Andropov. This grant may be fairly broad—particularly if a consensus has been reached that the existing problems are severe enough to require strong administrative action, including higher level personnel changes. The sequence of personnel shifts initiated since Andropov became General Secretary—particularly those involving Central Committee departments, the Komsomol, MVD, and KGB—while not all redounding exclusively to Andropov's favor—do indicate considerable political momentum on his part. The same applies to the "anticorruption" campaign now rapidly picking up steam.

Nevertheless, Andropov's authority is, for the time being at least, contingent upon the approval of his peers. He must seek to accommodate Ustinov's concerns with respect to military affairs and to find common language at the very least with Ustinov and Gromyko in foreign policy. His rival, Chernenko, at the moment still occupies one of the highest spots in the leadership rank order and, equally important, still sits in the Secretariat. Both Chernenko and Gorbachev are full participants in Politburo meetings, preventing Andropov from being the sole spokesman of the Secretariat at these meetings or the sole spokesman of the Politburo at Secretariat meetings.

If the constraints on Andropov's freedom of action are as described, he is likely to be able to increase his power in the Politburo, only gradually through policy-based alliances with senior members of the group, formation of alliances with their subordinates (for example, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov), bribery or blackmail of other members, promotions to "vacancies" in the Politburo and age-related replacements (for example, of Arvid Pelshe or Nikolay Tikhonov). Consolidating power, as in past successions, will take time. 25X1

Control Over Economic Policy Also Limited

In the economic policy sphere, Andropov's direct control is similarly circumscribed. Chernenko may still exercise significant control in the Secretariat over appointments to middle-level jobs. The junior secretary who has long been responsible for cadres in the Secretariat, Ivan Kapitonov, also remains in office. Although the personnel changes which have been made in the economic area have almost certainly been approved by Andropov, they may also have been perfectly acceptable to the rest of the Politburo (for example, the promotion of the First Deputy Minister of Railways to replace the disgraced Minister of Railways). The struggle in the Secretariat over the power to control personnel appointments has probably not yet ended. Until Andropov dominates cadre appointments, attempts to implement changes in economic policy will be severely shackled. 25X1 25X1

Meanwhile, the key post of Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) is still held by Nikolay Baybakov, an influential architect of economic policy since 1965 and a strong supporter of the status quo. In addition, the Secretariat/Council of Ministers "team" for industrial affairs has been only partially restructured. In the Secretariat, Ryzhkov will share authority with Vladimir Dolgikh (who is probably not in Andropov's good graces, but nevertheless outranks Ryzhkov), while in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, Aliyev—whatever his precise responsibilities may be as one of two first deputy chairmen—will have to deal with Tikhonov and an unchanged cast of deputy chairmen. As yet there has been no change in top-level personnel responsible for agriculture in the Secretariat, Presidium of the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Agriculture, or Gosplan. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Andropov's Tactical Advantages and Disadvantages

Andropov does enjoy important assets in attempting to expand his power, and he is evidently already

beginning to employ some of them. As General Secretary, he is able to exercise strong influence over agenda setting and policy initiation in the Politburo. He may be following Khrushchev's example of using selective publicity about the conduct of leadership business to promote his own political interests, although a more open information policy has been advocated by other leaders (for example, Chernenko) and may serve a variety of other political purposes. Brezhnev's precedent—and Andropov's own knowledge—have made it possible for him to begin immediately playing a leading and overt role in Soviet diplomacy. If he is not already Chairman of the Defense Council, the chances are that his colleagues will be persuaded to entrust this post to him, which will heighten his influence in military and military-budgetary affairs. As head of the Secretariat, he can intervene in high-level personnel removals and appointments, which he is already doing. He can also set in motion policy studies, order Central Committee departments to take action affecting economic and other bureaucracies, and initiate broad public discussion of certain policy issues (for example, economic reform).

Within the system at large, Andropov's influence is limited by weaknesses in his constituency base. Most importantly, he lacks clientele in the party apparatus outside the foreign policy–security–ideology areas—particularly among line officials at the oblast level, who are heavily represented in the Central Committee. Ryzhkov's appointment suggests that Andropov may have "inherited" at least part of Kirilenko's clientele. If this is the case, we might also expect to see the promotion of Ryzhkov's associate from Sverdlovsk and current First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, Yakov Ryabov. However, the inheritance would be limited and dependent upon Andropov's demonstrated ability to provide rewards. Andropov likewise lacks a broad clientele in the Council of Ministers and economic bureaucracy.

But Andropov does enjoy certain constitutency strengths:

- His influence over the KGB, access to derogatory KGB information, opportunity of using the KGB as a pool to fill other jobs, and the general intimidating effect of public awareness of his KGB connection.
- His ties in foreign policy and ideological circles.
- His ability to tap the frustration of thousands of younger, better educated, and—perhaps—more competent officials whose careers were stymied by Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres."
- His presumed capacity to meet the need widely felt among both elites and the population at large for a "strong leader" who will enforce "discipline" and combat pervasive corruption. 25X1

Andropov will attempt to use these resources to consolidate his power. He will try to manipulate policy issues (especially economic stagnation) to justify those personnel changes required to solidify his own personal position, while at the same time employing his enhanced power to implement whatever broader policy changes—such as structural innovation in the economy—he decides to back. But there are big risks involved, particularly in the purge strategy that his own political resources and relatively advanced age would appear to dictate. If his handling of the dissidents over the last decade is any guide, he is likely to proceed at a measured pace. 25X1 25X1

This does not mean that large changes in personnel and policy will not occur in the weeks and months ahead. Significant changes were introduced during the consolidation phases of both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's rule when prior policies were clearly bankrupt, new situations occurred, or when all factions—for their own reasons—reached agreement. With a mandate for movement, Andropov can identify himself with what is, in fact, change acceptable to a majority of his Politburo colleagues, while working to secure a still more powerful position for himself. 25X1

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